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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the role of United Nations (UN) op-
erations in the area of international peace and security has increasingly
become a topical issue for the different nations of the world. In par-
ticular, the use of force by, and in support of, peacekeeping has raised
questions concerning the future role of UN peacekeeping operations in
the resolution of international and internal conflict. During the Cold
War there were two accepted forms of United Nations operations:
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. Since the end of the Cold War,
however, despite increasing difficulties faced by UN peacekeeping op-
erations, no accepted mode of action beyond these two operations has
emerged. This has become problematic as the UN has consistently cho-
sen to use peacekeeping forces as its primary tool in its effort to restore
peace and security; despite the fact that peacekeeping, in itself, is not
always an effective means to achieve these ends.
Why did peacekeeping come to be used in situations that increas-
ingly necessitated the use of coercive force? Primarily because
peacekeeping provided a legal and 'palatable' form of intervention in in-
trastate conflicts, which have erupted with greater frequency in recent
times. The use of UN peacekeepers to intervene and resolve conflict
was acceptable to Member States and met with their growing demands
and expectations that action be taken to contain State fragmentation
and resolve humanitarian crises. Due to their acceptability, such forces
were authorized and implemented. The circumstances into which the
UN intervened, however, were often volatile and not conducive to effec-
tive peacekeeping: situations where, for example, the consent of the
warring factions could only be obtained conditionally or where there
was no governmental authority in existence with whom the UN could
negotiate and work. The Security Council authorized the use of force by
and in support of some of these UN peacekeeping operations to enable
their mandates to be achieved. Ultimately this has meant that UN
peacekeeping has moved beyond the three main legal principles upon
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which it was originally based, notably the principles of consent, impar-
tiality and non-use of force except in self-defense. Arguably,
peacekeeping has outstripped its original doctrinal justifications and as
a result now flounders without guidelines and with ill-defined purpose.
The use of force by and in support of UN peacekeeping operations
has narrowed the gap that previously existed between peacekeeping
and coercive peace-enforcement. Yet the use of force in such instances
is controversial, primarily because there is no universally accepted
agreement as to how and when force should be used. This gives rise to
many legal issues. For example, how broad is a peacekeeper's inherent
right to self-defense? When does force used in 'self-defense' become an
enforcement measure? When does peacekeeping become coercive peace-
enforcement? One way to address these questions is to clarify the legal
issues that have emerged due to these developments. Their clarifica-
tion is not only of theoretical interest, it is of great practical importance.
Determining the legal basis for the use of force enables a conceptual
framework to be built up regarding its use. A sound legal understand-
ing of this issue would provide the basis for comprehensive policies to be
formulated concerning the way in which force is used by UN peacekeep-
ers. It will help address the current problems facing United Nations
peacekeeping by ensuring that Security Council resolutions are trans-
lated into clear and effective rules of engagement, which will be ad-
hered to by troops in the field.
Not surprisingly, if a peacekeeping operation's mandate is not
clear, its rules of engagement will not be clear. Lack of clarity in a
mandate or its legal basis invariably gives rise to problems in inter-
preting or implementing the objectives of the operation. Thus, the cri-
teria for using force are important to define. Sound reasons are needed
to explain and justify why force may be used in one situation and not in
another. Furthermore, such criteria must be accepted by all the parties
involved in the peacekeeping operation - the parties involved in the
conflict and the countries who have donated troops. By using legal rea-
soning to justify the use of force, a consensus among Member States is
more likely to emerge as to when and how force should be used by the
United Nations. The future credibility of the United Nations depends
on successful peacekeeping operations. Operations that have clearly de-
fined mandates and legally obtainable objectives are more likely to suc-
ceed than those that do not. Clearly therefore, it is most important to
concentrate on resolving the legal difficulties underpinning these opera-
tions.
This paper focuses on the extent to which UN peacekeeping opera-
tions can use force in self-defense. Clearly this is just one of the areas
regarding peacekeeping and the use of force which needs to be clari-
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fied.1 It is an area that warrants particular attention, however, due to
the fact that self-defense is the one 'legitimate' way in which peace-
keepers can use force. 2 The first part of this paper gives an overview of
UN peacekeeping operations and the legal principles governing these
operations. Part two examines the history and development of the use
of force by UN peacekeeping operations. In particular, the idea that
self-defense, in the context of peacekeeping, may include using force 'in
defense of one's mandate' is examined. Part three details some recent
examples of Security Council resolutions which authorized, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, the use of force in a way that arguably expands
this concept of self-defense even further. Finally, I discuss the legal and
practical implications this development has for the future of
peacekeeping.
This paper focuses on the use of force by peacekeeping forces, as
opposed to the use of force in support of peacekeeping forces. The rea-
son for this limitation is not only space constraints, but the fact that the
issues raised by these different uses of force are in fact quite distinct
and are not necessarily ideally dealt with together. The use of force as
an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter is legal
where the Security Council has found a threat to international peace
and security and has authorized the use of force.3 In the context of a
peacekeeping operation the use of force raises different issues. Whilst it
may be argued that it is legal for the Security Council to authorize the
use of force by UN peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII, this
flies in the face of one of the fundamental legal principles governing
peacekeeping operations: the principle of non-use of force. If it is ac-
cepted that peacekeeping operations can only use force in self-defense,
as is generally agreed, one must question whether the concept can be
stretched to include more forceful measures, the likes of which have
been authorized in recent times. This paper seeks to answer some of
these questions.
1. Another area, for example, might be to what degree the use of force by Member
States in support of peacekeeping operations is compatible with the underlying principles
of peacekeeping.
2. As distinguished from a "lawful" use of force authorized under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. This is due to the fact that one of the principles of traditional peacekeeping
was that force only be used in self-defense. U.N. CHARTER arts. 42-43. See discussion be-
low concerning the legal principles governing United Nations peacekeeping operations.
3. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace or security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
The purpose of this section is to give a broad overview and some
background to UN peacekeeping operations, their legal underpinnings
and core characteristics. No attempt is made to give a detailed critique
of the subject matter. Indeed, there is a vast array of scholarly writings
available on the topic, which highlight the complex and controversial
nature of these operations. 4 For the purposes of this paper, however, a
few general comments about the nature of peacekeeping operations, are
appropriate.
A. Definition of "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"
No two UN peacekeeping operations are alike.5 Each operation is
distinguished by the environment in which it operates and the extent to
which it is authorized to carry out various peacekeeping functions. Fur-
thermore, each operation builds upon the experience of past operations.
Thus by definition UN peacekeeping operations are evolutionary in na-
ture. For the purposes of delineating the scope and character of such
operations, however, it is possible to make some general observations
about their distinguishing features and thereby formulate a broad defi-
nition of the concept.
Peacekeeping operations are an invention of the United Nations.
They were developed in response to the political realities of the Cold
War, brought about by the need to address conflicts which occurred af-
ter entry into force of the UN Charter and for which the mechanisms
provided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter could not be used.6
4. See, e.g., D.W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY (1964); Dan
Ciobanu, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-Keeping Operations, in
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS (A. Cassese ed., 1978); John W. Halder-
man, Legal Basis for United Nations Forces, 56 AMER. J. INT'L L. 971 (1962); Rosalyn
Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-Keeping, in UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS (A. Cassese ed., 1978); Georg Schwarzenberger, Problems
of a United Nations Force, in 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 247 (George W. Keeton &
Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1959).
5. Indeed, Bowett lists nine different categories of peacekeeping being (1) cease-fire,
truces and armistice functions entrusted to "observer" groups; (2) frontier control; (3) in-
terpositionary functions (undertaken to "secure a cessation of hostilities'); (3) defense and
security of UN zones or areas placed under UN control; (5) the maintenance of law and
order in a State; (6) plebiscite supervision (undertaken in order to "determine the status
of a territory disputed between two sovereign States'); (7) assistance and relief for na-
tional disasters (undertaken in order to provide humanitarian relief); (8) prevention of
international crimes; and (9) disarmament functions: See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 268-
74. Schachter lists eight different categories along similar lines. Oscar Schachter, Author-
ized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 80 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
1991).
6. For a discussion of the development of peacekeeping and the early operations, see:
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The means provided for in Chapter VI, concerning the pacific settle-
ment of disputes, were inadequate. The means provided for in Chapter
VII, concerning the enforcement measures, could not be agreed upon by
Members of the Security Council due essentially to the profound ideo-
logical differences that prevailed during the Cold War. Peacekeeping
emerged as a mode of international intervention other than those pro-
vided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.
Peacekeeping operations have been defined broadly as:
[O]peration[s] involving military personnel, but without enforcement
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore
international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations
are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they
involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not
by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of
the United Nations under Article 42. 7
Generally speaking, peacekeeping operations consist of either: (1)
unarmed observer missions; or (2) forces which have the function of sus-
taining peacemaking efforts by helping to create conditions in which
negotiation between warring parties can take place.8 The latter type of
operation is typically armed and may use force in limited circumstances
that are discussed below. Given that the theme of this paper concerns
the use of force by peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping operations
are defined here to cover the latter type of operation only.
BOwETT, supra note 4; UNITED NATIONS, BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING, U.N. Doc. DPI/1800, U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.14 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
BLUE HELMETS 1]; 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, THE MIDDLE
EAST 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1969); 2 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, ASIA 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1970); 3
ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, AFRICA 1946-1967: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY (1980); 4 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, EUROPE
1946-1979: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1981); Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of
United Nations Peace-Keeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451 (1993).
7. UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS iI].
8. See Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, 19 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 10 (1995); Goulding, supra note 6, at 457. Note, however, that
peacekeeping operations can be divided up into many more categories. For example, both
Bowett and Schachter list many different categories of peacekeeping. See supra note 5.
Given that each peacekeeping operation tends to be designed for the unique situation into
which it must operate, it is not surprising that many different categories exist.
VOL. 27:2244
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B. The Legal Principles Governing United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations
As the concept of peacekeeping evolved, UN peacekeeping opera-
tions developed core legal principles that became fundamental to their
operation. These principles are contained in various legal documents
concerning peacekeeping operations, such as the Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs) and rules of engagement. 9 They embody the es-
sence of peacekeeping and permeate all aspects of an operation.10 The
three main legal principles underlying peacekeeping are: (1) consent of
all parties concerned and the competent organ of the UN, usually the
Security Council;11 (2) impartiality; and (3) non-use of force except in
self-defense.
These principles developed over time and are based on sound legal
and practical reasoning. For example, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter
prohibits the United Nations from intervening in the domestic affairs of
a Member State except where Chapter VII enforcement measures are
involved. 12 Thus, a UN peacekeeping force can only intervene into the
domestic affairs of a State if the State concerned has consented to that
intervention and to the peacekeeping operation as a whole. 13 Similarly,
9. See infra note 32 and accompanying text discussing rules of engagement.
10. When a peacekeeping operation is set up, various agreements are drawn up be-
tween the United Nations and the Host State (Status-of-Forces Agreement) and between
the United Nations and contributing State(s). Model agreements of this nature have been
approved of by the General Assembly. See Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of
Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model of Status of Forces Agreement for
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 76, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990); Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question
of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Model Agreement Between the United
Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations
Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Item
74 of the Preliminary List, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (1991).
11. Peacekeeping operations, unlike enforcement measures, can be authorized by the
General Assembly (GA), but the GA has only done this on two occasions: UNEF 1 (United
Nations Emergency Force) which was established to secure the withdrawal of troops from
Egyptian territory and to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel; and UNSF (United
Nations Security Force) which was created to maintain peace and security in the West
Irian territory, UN Peacekeeping History, 1 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 1, 9 (1994).
12. Article 2, paragraph 7 reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
13. Although it is worth noting that previously the majority of peacekeeping opera-
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if the UN is to effectively "keep the peace," it must be impartial and un-
biased in its operations. It is obvious that it would be extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the UN to engage in coercive force and still be
regarded as a neutral body. For this reason the use of force by UN
peacekeeping forces has been limited to that used in self-defense.
In more recent times a "second generation" of peacekeeping has
evolved. 14 These operations, occurring principally since the end of the
Cold War, have increasingly involved civilian personnel and have been
given more complex and challenging mandates, such as helping to pro-
mote human rights and national reconciliation and organizing and
monitoring elections.' 5 Whilst the fundamental characteristics of these
peacekeeping operations have not changed from those of earlier opera-
tions as enumerated above, there is no doubt that all three of the main
legal principles underlying peacekeeping have been strained by the new
demands placed upon these operations. For example, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to gain the consent and cooperation of all parties in-
volved in UN peacekeeping operations. This has necessitated, at times,
an increased use of force by peacekeepers in carrying out UN mandates.
The perceived impartiality of operations has similarly become more dif-
ficult to maintain for this reason.
However, the legal principles upon which peacekeeping was
founded and evolved must be taken seriously. In particular (given the
focus of this paper) it is important to emphasize that the UN has been
very unwilling to go "beyond self-defense as the touchstone of the right
to use force" with respect to peacekeeping operations. 6 Indeed, the
Secretary-General and the Members of the United Nations "considered
tions have involved interstate disputes as opposed to intrastate disputes. It is only more
recently that peacekeeping operations have been involved in disputes contained within a
single State. See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN
LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 23 (1995).
14. Boutros-Ghali acknowledges this development in his introduction to the United
Nations publication, THE BLUE HELMETS. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 5. Ratner
similarly discusses these developments in his book. RATNER, supra note 13. See also NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING (Daniel Warner ed., 1995); Mats R. Berdal, The Security
Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After the Cold War, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 71 (1996); Kelly A. Childers, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars
and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 117 (1994); Fink, supra note 8, at 1; Roy S. Lee, United Nations Peacekeep-
ing: Development and Prospects, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 619 (1995); Ruth Wedgwood, The
Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631 (1995).
15. BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 3. Ratner describes the new breadth of respon-
sibility of UN peacekeepers as having fallen into ten categories: (1) military matters, (2)
elections, (3) human rights, (4) national reconciliation, (5) law and order, (6) refugees, (7)
humanitarian relief, (8) governmental administration, (9) economic reconstruction, and
(10) relationships with outside actors. He describes the depth of responsibility as covering
(1) monitoring, (2) supervision, (3) control, (4) conduct, (5) technical assistance, and (6)
public information. RATNER, supra note 13, at 42-43.
16. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
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it essential from a political and legal standpoint to distinguish
peacekeeping from enforcement by restricting the use of force to self-
defense."17 This point cannot be over-stressed as it indicates why con-
ceptually and in practice, the UN has been reluctant to move away from
the non-use of force by peacekeeping operations, and towards a more
forceful kind of peace-making operation (as distinguished from peace-
enforcement). A more thorough examination of the use of force by UN
peacekeeping forces is discussed below.' 8
C. The Constitutional Basis of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
The constitutional basis of United Nations peacekeeping operations
is the broad mandate of Article 1 of the Charter, under which one of the
purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and
security. 19 There is considerable debate amongst commentators as to
where the UN gets its more specific mandate within the Charter,20 al-
though there is now little doubt that the UN does have the power to
authorize such operations. 21 This was not always the case. Initially,
some States protested the establishment of such operations. They ar-
gued that because peacekeeping operations were not specifically pro-
vided for in the UN Charter it was beyond the power of the Security
Council to establish them. 22 On these grounds, and due to disputes over
the constitutional basis within the Charter for such actions, certain
States (including the former USSR and France) refused to pay their
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See discussion below on the use of force in self-defense and the use of force in de-
fense of one's mandate.
19. Article 1(1) reads as follows:
The Purposes of the United Nations are: (1) To maintain international
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
20. One issue, for example, is whether the legal basis to establish such operations is
found under Chapter VI of the Charter or under the various articles of Chapter VII.
There are numerous articles and books discussing this issue. See, e.g., BOWETT, supra
note 4; Higgins, supra note 4; Halderman, supra note 4; Schwarzenberger, supra note 4;
Finn Seyersted, Can the United Nations Establish Military Forces and Perform Other Acts
Without Specific Basis in the Charter? 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 351 (1961), reprinted in 12
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FIR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 188 (1962); Louis B. Sohn, The
Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations
Force, 52 AMER. J. INT'L L. 229 (1958).
21. See HILAIRE McCOUBREY & NIGEL WHITE, THE BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL
REGULATIONS OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS 50-55 (1996); RATNER, supra
note 13 at 58; Schachter, supra note 5, at 82.
22. See Schachter, supra note 5, at 80.
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share of the early peacekeeping bills. These States argued that such
actions were not "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the Charter. 23 The matter went to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations
Case, in which the Court confirmed obiter the constitutionality of the
UN peacekeeping operations UNEF I and ONUC.2 4 The ICJ stated
that: "[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the asser-
tion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment [sic] of one of the stated
purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such an action
is not ultra vires the Organisation." 25
The ICJ stressed that although peacekeeping operations were not
to be regarded as "enforcement measures" within the domain of Chapter
VII of the Charter,2 6 there was no doubt that because the Security
Council had those enforcement powers it was within the power of the
Security Council to implement less forceful measures. 27 However,
whilst it was made clear that the Security Council had the legal capac-
ity to establish peacekeeping operations, no opinion was given as to
where the constitutional sources of such operations lay.28
However, insofar as UN peacekeeping forces are entitled to use
force in self-defense they cannot be regarded as purely pacific means of
dispute settlement under Chapter VI. It is for this reason that Chapter
VII is usually thought to provide the general legal basis for UN
peacekeeping operations, although such operations are not Chapter VII
enforcement measures and should not be regarded as such. Consider-
able debate still exists as to which Articles of Chapter VII have actually
been used to authorize the various operations.29 As it is not essential to
determine the exact legal basis for UN peacekeeping operations for the
purpose of this paper, I will not enter into a detailed discussion. It is
enough to say that the legality of UN peacekeeping under Chapter VII
23. Article 17(2) states that "Mhe expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2.
24. Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 167. See infra
notes 36, 37, and 40 and accompanying text for background information on UNEF I and
ONUC.
25. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
26. The I.C.J. stated that the "operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not en-
forcement actions within the compass of Chapter VII .... Id. at 166.
27. Id. at 167. The idea presumably being that the power to implement forceful
measures encompasses the power to implement less forceful measures. This principle,
("qui peut le plus peut le moins" which is loosely translated as the "greater encompasses
the lesser") is acknowledged by Georges Fischer. See Georges Fischer, Article 42, in LA
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 705 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds., 1985).
28. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 166-67.
29. The five main Articles which have been put forward as providing the possible le-
gal basis for peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the Charter are Articles 39,
40, 41, 42 & 48(1) and various combinations thereof. For a discussion on possible constitu-
tional bases for peacekeeping operations, see supra note 20.
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is generally acknowledged, even if the precise source of that legality
cannot be agreed upon. On this point, however, it is worth noting that
peacekeeping operations have been described as falling conceptually be-
tween Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter and, accordingly,
have been referred to as Chapter "Six and a Half' operations.30 This is
due to the fact that peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved
the use of military personnel (i.e. they have gone beyond a purely dip-
lomatic settlement of disputes outlined in Chapter VI of the Charter)
but not Chapter VII enforcement measures. Although this is a symbolic
analysis, it is nonetheless a legal fiction. A peacekeeping operation
cannot find its constitutional basis in a non-existent Article of the Char-
ter.
III. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE BY UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
As described above, one of the three main legal principles of
peacekeeping is that force is only to be used in self-defense. Indeed, the
right of UN peacekeeping operations to exercise force in self-defense is
one of the authorized legal categories for the use of force by the United
Nations and may be thought of as an 'inherent right' of the peacekeep-
ers.31 There is considerable practice that supports this view and the
right to self-defense has been consistently provided for in the rules of
engagement established for each peacekeeping operation since their in-
ception. 32 Evidently, under the rules of engagement, instructions on the
use of force in self-defense in a peacekeeping operation may vary con-
siderably from those designed to suit a Chapter VII enforcement opera-
tion. 33 This leads one to ask what constitutes self-defense within the
30. Dag Hammarskjold, former United Nations Secretary-General, described
peacekeeping as being authorized by Chapter "Six and a Half." See BLUE HELMETS II, su-
pra note 7, at 5.
31. Schachter lists six legal categories for the use of force by the United Nations,
which he describes as: (1) Armed force as an enforcement measure taken by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, particularly Article 42; (2) Collective self-defense in accor-
dance with Article 51; (3) Individual self-defense under Article 51; (4) Enforcement meas-
ures under regional arrangements or by regional agencies under Article 53; (5)
Peacekeeping forces of the United Nations authorized by the Security Council or General
Assembly and deployed in agreement with the States concerned; and (6) Joint action by
the five permanent Members pursuant to Article 106 of the Charter. See Schachter, supra
note 5, at 65.
32. When the Security Council authorizes a UN operation to use force, the way in
which force may be exercised is set out in the rules of engagement. The rules of engage-
ment "specify the circumstances in which armed force may be used by a military unit and
its permissible extent and degree." See McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 146.
33. Indeed, the importance of the rules of engagement should not be underestimated.
Rowe has stated, "In reality the mandate given by the Security Council is no real indica-
tion of how much force has been authorized by the Council for those engaged in enforcing
it. Rather, it is the rules of engagement which set out the degree of force that may be
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realm of a UN peacekeeping operation? Certainly it differs from its
usual legal meaning.3 4 The concept of self-defense in the context of
peacekeeping evolved over time and in response to the changing needs
of peacekeepers in different operations. Initially, a narrow approach
was taken: force could only be used in defense of the peacekeeping op-
eration itself and strictly in response to an armed attack ('personal self-
defense'). Gradually, a much broader view evolved: force could be used
'in defense of one's mandate.' In other words, force could be used to 'de-
fend' the objects and purposes of the peacekeeping operation. The evo-
lution of self-defense in the context of peacekeeping and the scope of
this broader approach is discussed in more detail below.
A. Use of Force in Self-defense ('Personal Self-Defense)
In the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, UNEF 1,35 peace-
keepers were instructed never to initiate the use of force, although they
could respond to armed attacks with force and could resist attempts to
make them withdraw from their positions. 36 In his report on UNEF I,
Dag Hammarskjold wrote:
[T]he rule is applied that men engaged in the operation may never
take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to re-
spond with force to an attack with arms, including attempts to use
force to make them withdraw from positions which they occupy un-
der orders from the Commander... The basic element involved is
clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed
force.37
This definition of self-defense was narrow and yet adequate for the
UNEF I operation because the UN troops involved in UNEF I were
maintaining a cease-fire on a front line between two orderly armed
forces. Furthermore, there was only a small civilian population living
in the area. 38 Thus, the amount of force which UNEF I was authorized
to use was sufficient for the purposes of fulfilling its mandate.
used." Peter Rowe, The United Nations Rules of Engagement and the British Soldier in
Bosnia, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 946, 947 (1994).
34. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
35. United Nations Emergency Force I.
36. UNEF I operated from November 1956 - June 1967. Its function was to "secure
and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces...
from Egyptian territory, and after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between Egyptian
and Israeli forces." UNITED NATIONS, UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET 9 (1996) [hereinafter
UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET].
37. United Nations Emergency Force, Summary Study of the Experience Derived From
the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the Secretary General, UN GAOR,
13th Sess., Agenda Item 65(c) 1 179, U.N. Doc A/3943 (1958) (emphasis added).
38. Marrack Goulding, The Use of Force by the United Nations, in MOUNTBATTEN-
TATA MEMORIAL LECTURE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 8 (1995).
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The same was not true of ONUC in the Congo, where circum-
stances eventually compelled the UN to authorize the peacekeeping op-
eration to use more extensive force. 39 ONUC was deployed in the sum-
mer of 1960 to essentially assist the Government of the Congo in
carrying out tasks related to the maintenance of law and order. Ini-
tially, the establishment of the force was based upon the principles of
UNEF I, including the principle that there should be no initiative in the
use of armed force by UN troops. This is made clear in the First Report
of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 196040 in which Hammarskjold reiterated
his earlier comments made in the UNEF I Report regarding the limits
on the use of force by UN troops. In this report he again emphasized
the prohibition of any initiative by UN forces in the use of armed
force.41
The original mandate of the operation emphasized the restoration
of law and order in the Congo. 42 Soon after the deployment of ONUC,
opposition and secessionist movements in the Congo brought about dis-
order and violence and the peacekeeping operation started to face diffi-
culties. It became evident that ONUC could not achieve its objective of
halting the civil war whilst it was limited to the use of force within the
confines of 'personal self-defense.' 43 If ONUC were to act effectively it
would need to be able to exercise a more expanded use of force. Under
39. United Nations Operation in the Congo. ONUC operated between July 1960 -
June 1964. Its initial function was to "ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist
the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance." Later
this function was modified to include "maintaining the territorial integrity and political
independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the re-
moval from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not un-
der the UN command and all mercenaries." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36,
at 19.
40. First Report by the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, United Nations Emergency Force, Summary Study of
the Experienced Derived From the Establishment and Operation of the Force: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960).
41. He stated as follows:
In my initial statement I recalled the rule applied in previous United Na-
tions operations to the effect that the military units would be entitled to
act only in self-defence. In amplification of this statement I would like to
quote the following passage from the report to which I referred. '[Mien en-
gaged in the operation may never take the initiative in the use of armed
force, but are entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms, in-
cluding attempts to use force to make them withdraw from positions which
they occupy under orders from the Commander', acting under the authority
of the Security Council and within the scope of its resolution. 'The basic
element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative in the use
of armed force.
Id. 15 (emphasis in original).
42. S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 873d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
43. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 201.
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the circumstances the Security Council revised the mandate of ONUC
to enable it to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war in the
Congo.44 It is hard not to view this authorization for the use of force as
going beyond self-defense. As Bowett has stated, "[I]t is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the Security Council by this Resolution
[S/RES/161(1961)] abandoned a strict reliance on the principle of self-
defence." 45 However it is interesting that the Secretary-General con-
tinued to express the opinion that troops should only engage in defen-
sive action, or they would risk becoming a party to the conflict.46
Bowett regards this statement as "clinging to the 'self-defence' con-
cept."
47
In many ways the UN's experience in the Congo was a premonition
of the difficulties that came with the evolution of the more complex sec-
ond generation of peacekeeping operations. Although it is generally
agreed that ONUC was a peacekeeping operation, there is no doubt that
it involved some enforcement elements. 48 In the operation's aftermath,
44. In Security Council Resolution 161, paragraph 1, the Security Council urged,
"that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occur-
rence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all
military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
resort." S.C. Res. 161, U.N. SCOR, 942d mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961) (emphasis
added). In Security Council Resolution 169, paragraph 4, the Security Council authorized
the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure
of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action
and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advis-
ers not under the UN Command, and mercenaries... S.C. Res. 169, U.N. SCOR, 982d
mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961) (emphasis added).
45. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 201-02.
46. See Report of the Secretary-General on Certain Steps Taken in Regard to the Im-
plementation of the Security Council Resolution Adopted on 21 February 1961, U.N.
SCOR, 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4752, Annex 7 (1961).
47. BOWETT, supra note 4, at 202.
48. There has been dispute about whether or not ONUC was actually a peacekeeping
operation because it was couched in language of Chapter VII of the Charter and author-
ized the use of force. The consensus is that ONUC was not an "enforcement action." This
was the determination of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Case. Certain Expenses of the
United Nations Case (Art. 17, Para. 2 of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 177. Certainly,
the purposes for which ONUC was created "were essentially different from those for
which, at San Francisco, forces used under Article 42 were contemplated." See BoWETT,
supra note 4, at 176. The United Nations force in the Congo was present with the consent
of the government of Congo and the measures authorized by the Security Council were
specifically aimed at implementing the Security Council peacekeeping mandate. Fur-
thermore, as Higgins points out, "even though the circumstances in which ONUC was
permitted to use force was [sic] enlarged, the action was still not a sanction against the
Congo[, and] there is ample evidence that the UN still regarded itself as bound by the
domestic jurisdiction requirements .. " For example, the Article 2(7) restraint operated
so that intervention into the internal affairs of a State was not permissible without the
consent of that State. 3 HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 58. Most commentators express the
view that the constitutional basis of ONUC lay in Article 40, Chapter VII of the Charter.
This was the view of the Secretary-General and has been described as the "official" view of
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and as a result of the UN's experiences in the Congo, the narrow defini-
tion of self-defense was revised. It was thought that a broader defini-
tion of self-defense would make peacekeeping operations more viable
and would enable the United Nations to effectively carry out
peacekeeping mandates without the need to resort to 'enforcement
measures.' Thus ONUC, while not the definitive peacekeeping opera-
tion of the Cold War period due to its expansive use of force, played a
notable role in the development of the use of force within the realm of
peacekeeping.49
B. Use of Force in Defense of One's Mandate
When the UN peacekeeping operation was set up in Cyprus the
situation with regards to the use of force in self-defense was more
clearly defined by the Secretary-General.5 0  In an Aide-Memoire of the
Secretary-General Concerning Some Questions Relating to the Function
and Operation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 10
April 196451 the Secretary-General outlined an expanded definition of
self-defense. The traditional principles were confirmed (for example,
the principle that troops should never take the initiative in the use of
armed force) but additional elements were included in the definition.5 2
the United Nations. See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 177; 3 HIGGINS, supra note 6, at 54-60;
Schachter, supra note 5, at 82.
49. Fink has written, "The concept of self-defense, as well as the principles of non-
intervention and sovereignty, were loosely defined and greatly modified in the Congo op-
eration." See Fink, supra note 8, at 15.
50. The United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has operated
from 1964 to the present. Its initial mandate was to "prevent a recurrence of fighting be-
tween Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the mainte-
nance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." Since 1974 its
mandate has been expanded and UNFICYP has "supervised the cease-fire and main-
tained a buffer zone." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36, at 17-18.
51. Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/5653 (1964).
52. Id. I I 17(c), 18 (c). The full text of the Principles of Self-Defence read as follows:
16. Troops of UNFICYP shall not take the initiative in the use of armed
force. The use of armed force is permissible only in self-defence. The ex-
pression "self-defence" includes:
(a) The defence of United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under
armed attack;
(b) The support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack.
17. No action is to be taken by the troops of UNFICYP which is likely to
bring them in to direct conflict with either community in Cyprus, except in
the following circumstances:
(a) Where members of the Force are compelled to act in self-defence;
(b) Where the safety of the force or of members of it is in jeopardy;
(c) Where specific arrangements accepted by both communities have
been or in the opinion of the commander on the spot are about to be,
violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or endangering law and
order.
18. When acting in self-defence, the principle of minimum force shall al-
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Thus while troops were not to take the initiative in the use of armed
force, they could use force in "self-defense" where:
specific arrangements accepted by both communities have been or
... are about to be violated, thus risking a recurrence of fighting or
endangering law and order . .. [or where there were] attempts by
force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as
ordered by their commanders. 53
The most significant expansion to be noted here, and one that de-
finitively moves way from the idea that self-defense only includes the
defense of the peacekeeping force itself, is the premise that peacekeep-
ers could use force in response to attempts by force to prevent them
from carrying out their responsibilities or where agreements agreed to
by both sides were not honored. Interestingly, it seems that force could
even be used in 'anticipatory self-defense' where such agreements were
about to be violated.
This interpretation of self-defense, although expressed more gener-
ally, was reapplied in 1973 when UNEF II was established.5 4 In the
Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security
Council 340 (1973), Kurt Waldheim, the then Secretary-General, wrote
ways be applied, and armed force will be used only when all peaceful
means of persuasion have failed. The decision as to when force may be
used under these circumstances rests with the commander on the spot,
whose main concern will be to distinguish between an incident which does
not require fire to be opened and those situations in which troops may be
authorized to use force. Examples in which troops may be so authorized
are:
(a) Attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from i position
which they occupy under orders from their commanders, or to "
infiltrate and envelop such positions as are deemed necessary by their
commanders for them to hold, thus jeopardizing their safety;
(b) Attempts by force to disarm them;
(c) Attempts by force to prevent them from carrying out their respon-
sibilities as ordered by their commanders;
(d) Violation by force of United Nations premises and attempts to ar-
rest or abduct United Nations personnel, civil or military.
19. Should it be necessary to resort to the use of arms, advance warning
will be given whenever possible. Automatic weapons are not to be used ex-
cept in extreme emergency and fire will continue only as long as is neces-
sary to achieve its immediate aim.
Id. 11 16-19.
53. Id. 1 17(c)-18 (c).
54. United Nations Emergency Force II. UNEF II operated from October 1973 to
July 1979. Its function was to "supervise the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli
forces and, following the conclusion of agreements... [and] to supervise the redeployment
of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under
those agreements." UN PEACEKEEPING BOOKLET, supra note 36, at 10. See also Goulding,
supra note 38, at 9; Adam Roberts, From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use
of Force, 37 SURvIvAL 7 (1995).
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that self-defense included "resistance to attempts by forceful means to
prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Secu-
rity Council."5 5  In other words, self-defense included situations in
which peacekeepers needed to use force to fulfil their mandate. This is
a significantly broadened definition of self-defense when compared to
the definition that applied in UNEF I, and may be regarded as covering
all subsequent UN peacekeeping operations.5 6 Indeed, Boutros-Ghali
made it clear in 1993, that at least at that point in time, "existing rules
of engagement allow [United Nations soldiers to open fire] if armed per-
sons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their orders." 57
C. Conclusion
As discussed above, one of the legal principles of peacekeeping is
that the use of force is restricted to that used in self-defense. The fact
that this is a legal principle which the UN considers to be binding upon
itself can be gauged from the way it responded to difficulties encoun-
tered whilst operating within this self-imposed limit. Instead of doing
away with the principle, it remained, as Schachter has described, the
"touchstone" of peacekeeping and the use of force was justified by
adopting an expanded and somewhat artificial definition of self-
defense.58 The actual scope of this expanded notion of 'self-defense,' and
the extent to which it applies, and has applied, in various peacekeeping
operations, is not clear. If self-defense is interpreted broadly to mean
'in defense of one's mandate' in all operations, it would presumably
mean that if any operation is hindered (by the use of force) from carry-
ing out any part of its mandate, its inherent right to 'self-defense' enti-
tles it to use force in order to fulfil its duties. The ability of a
peacekeeping operation to use force would then largely depend on how
broad its mandate was. The broader the mandate, the more occasions
in which the peacekeeping operation might find itself not only needing
to use force but also legally 'permitted' to do so.
However, interpreting self-defense in this manner, comes perilously
close to enforcement measures. Such an approach leads one to ask to
what extent force can be used in self-defense to fulfil a mandate and
still remain consistent with the principles of consent and impartiality
underlying peacekeeping operations? The answer lies in the fact that in
practice and for many years, commanders in the field have very rarely
55. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolu-
tion 340 (1973), U.N. SCOR 4(d), U.N. Doc S/l1052/Rev. 1 (1973). UNEF II was set up
on the basis of Security Council resolution 340 of October 25, 1973.
56. Goulding, supra note 38, at 9; Roberts, supra note 54, at 14.
57. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89, 91.
(1992)
58. Schachter, supra note 5, at 84.
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applied the expanded definition of self-defense.5 9 Instead, negotiation
and persuasion have been used. In reality the use of force in the con-
text of peacekeeping is a perilous activity which does not rest easily
along side the concepts of consent and impartiality. The reluctance to
use force in self-defense by commanders in the field is essentially in-
tended to secure the impartiality of peacekeepers and ensure the con-
tinued cooperation of the parties concerned. Thus, while theoretically
the concept of self-defense was broadened, in practice the expanded doc-
trine has remained, at least until more recent times, largely unused.
Clearly, UN peacekeeping operations have an inherent right to use
force in self-defense; at least in so far as they have a right to use force to
protect themselves and seemingly to defend at least some aspects of
their mandate. The issue remains, however, what is the scope of self-
defense in the context of peacekeeping? To what degree can force be
used in defense of one's mandate? Is the use of force limited to what is
necessary and proportionate? Where does anticipatory self-defense fit
into the picture? Do some uses of force in 'self-defense' need to be ex-
plicitly authorized by the Security Council or risk being considered an
illegal use of force? Some of the recent resolutions authorizing the use
of force have been couched in terms of "self-defense," indicating that at
least in some instances, the Security Council still takes the view that
force must be explicitly authorized, even if it is in 'self-defense.' In con-
trast, there are other resolutions that tend to indicate that no such
authorization is necessary. In this regard, the Security Council has
been inconsistent, or at least given confusing signals, with respect to
the extent to which the use of force by peacekeeping operations is possi-
ble. After an examination of recent UN peacekeeping operations, I will
discuss some possible answers to the above questions and also reflect on
whether or not such a use of force, whilst possibly legitimate, is desir-
able.
IV. BEYOND SELF-DEFENSE: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT USES OF
FORCE BY UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Since the end of the Cold War the number of peacekeeping opera-
tions authorized by the Security Council has outstripped the previous
operations not only in number but also in complexity and size.60 Many
of the peacekeeping operations established since 1989 have gone beyond
the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring cease-fires and control-
ling buffer zones between belligerent States. Although peacekeeping
operations continue to carry out such tasks, they have been entrusted
additionally with mandates as varied as the monitoring of troop with-
59. Roberts, supra note 54, at 14.
60. During the Cold War there were 15 peacekeeping operations. Since 1989 there
have been 26 established. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 3.
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drawals, elections and human rights violations.6 1 Peacekeeping forces
have also provided assistance in the resettlement of refugees and dis-
placed persons, the rebuilding of political and administrative structures
and the protection of deliveries of humanitarian relief supplies. Certain
peacekeeping operations, such as those deployed in Cambodia, Mozam-
bique, and Angola, required an integrated program in which most of the
above mentioned tasks were included.62
During the Cold War, the concept of self-defense, as elaborated
above, remained static and force was not widely used in practice by UN
peacekeeping forces. 63 Since then, as peacekeeping itself became more
complicated and difficult, peacekeepers have been authorized to use
force more liberally and have increasingly resorted to the use of force.
Both the authorization and use of force has come about for several rea-
sons: first, due to the number of attacks against civilian and military
personnel engaged in peacekeeping operations; secondly, in order to
more effectively carry out difficult mandates; and thirdly, due to more
complex conflict situations in which peacekeepers are engaged. Given
the limited scope of this paper, it is not possible, or desirable, to under-
take a detailed examination of all the peacekeeping operations that
have taken place since 1989. However, such an analysis is not neces-
sary for the purpose of illustrating the increasing tendency of the Secu-
rity Council to authorize the use of force by peacekeepers and in so do-
ing to give them more "muscle."64 In order to illustrate this trend I will
give examples of recent Security Council resolutions which explicitly
authorize peacekeepers to use force. I will also argue that the use of
force may have been implicitly sanctioned in other Security Council
resolutions. This can be shown by examining the language of these
resolutions and related United Nations reports.
It should be understood that this study is complicated by the fact
that in recent times the Security Council has "authorized Member
States to use all necessary means to achieve specific goals in operations
in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, separate from United Nations
peacekeeping missions."65 This kind of support was also authorized in
61. Ratner describes second generation peacekeeping in the following way: (1) Second
generation operations aim primarily at assisting a State or group of States in executing
an agreed political solution to a conflict; (2) Second generation peacekeeping operations
are limited to an exclusively military mandate, but can have a substantial or predomi-
nantly nonmilitary mandate and composition; (3) Second generation peacekeeping has
complex agendas; (4) The new peacekeeping is as likely to respond to an ostensibly inter-
nal conflict as an interstate conflict; (5) Second generation operations involve numerous
types of actors; (6) The new peacekeeping is a fluid phenomenon. See RATNER, supra note
13, at 21-24.
62. See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6.
63. Except in the case of the Congo.
64. Goulding, supra note 6, at 461
65. BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at 6.
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the former Yugoslavia, in the UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNTAES
peacekeeping operations. 66 Such measures, for the purpose of this pa-
per, are characterized as enforcement measures and are not within its
scope. 67 Instead, this paper focuses on examples where the peacekeep-
ing force itself was authorized to use force. It is acknowledged, how-
ever, that it is becoming harder to distinguish, legally speaking, be-
tween peacekeeping and enforcement measures. 68 Indeed, considerable
controversy exists in some instances as to how to characterize particu-
lar operations. UNOSOM 11,69 for example, is alternatively described as
a peacekeeping operation, 70 or as the first "peace-enforcement operation
authorized and commanded by the United Nations." 71 This confusion as
to characterization is borne in mind in undertaking this analysis.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the common theme that runs
through the peacekeeping operations discussed below, as it is this
theme which underlies the expanded use of force by peacekeepers. The
use of force, whether its specific purpose be to ensure freedom of move-
ment or protect a safe area, is primarily geared towards the ultimate
goal of alleviating human suffering. In this respect, I argue, that a sig-
nificant expansion of the use of force by peacekeepers has occurred.
Force, in these instances, has been used for the protection of civilians
and the protection of humanitarian activities. This use of force goes be-
yond self-defense, in even the broader sense of the meaning, because al-
though it might be termed as being in 'defense of a mandate', the man-
date now involves the protection of third parties, as distinct from the
protection of peacekeepers themselves (albeit in pursuit of their duties).
In the context of UNPROFOR, Marrack Goulding has stated that this
66. United Nations Protection Force, United Nations Confidence Restoration Opera-
tion in Croatia & United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Ba-
ranja, and Western Sirmium respectively. See S.C. Res. 1037, U.N. SCOR, 3619th mtg.
14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (1996) (UNTAES); S.C. Res. 981, U.N. SCOR, 3512th mtg. 6,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 (1995) (UNCRO); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg. 1 10, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/836 (1993) (created safe areas which Member States could protect through air
power); S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 3122d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992) revised by
S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (created no-fly zone
and gave Member States authority to use all necessary measures to enforce the ban).
67. I use the term "enforcement measures" to encompass measures outlined in Article
42 of the Charter which can be exercised once the Security Council has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, i.e., a more ac-
tive and aggressive use of force than that involved in peacekeeping. Thus, enforcement
measures are not undertaken with the consent of the State involved (in fact such meas-
ures are used 'against' the State) and the use of such force is offensive as opposed to de-
fensive. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
68. For a discussion on this point see Fink, supra note 8.
69. United Nations Operation in Somalia II.
70. UNOSOM II is included in the U.N.'s review of United Nations peace-keaping.
See BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6.
71. UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA 1992-1996 at 43, U.N.
Sales No. E.96.I.8 (1996) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA].
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use of force, under the "fig leaf of 'self-defence"', was incompatible with
the operation's peacekeeping role.72 It is for this reason that such an
expansion of the concept of self-defense should be considered carefully
before being adopted.
In the examination below I will trace the development of this
broader interpretation of self-defense. I have divided the analysis into
three categories: force authorized to deliver humanitarian assistance
and relief, force authorized to secure the freedom of movement of UN
personnel and force authorized to protect safe areas and protected sites
and populations. These are not watertight categories and, as will be-
come evident, there are frequent overlaps between the first two in par-
ticular. 73 It is also worth noting that events in the former Yugoslavia
dominate this analysis. Indeed, it has been said that the "performance
of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia will doubtlessly form a prototype
for successor peacekeeping forces assigned with a mission that involves
the use of force beyond self-defense."74
A. Force Authorized to Ensure Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance &
Relief- UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR, UNCRO & UNAMIR
The UN's involvement in the Somalia is long and complicated: it
consisted of three operations (and phases) being UNOSOM I, UNITAF
and UNOSOM II. UNOSOM I can be regarded as essentially a tradi-
tional peacekeeping operation that failed primarily because the situa-
tion into which in went was not conducive to peacekeeping. UNITAF, a
US-led multinational operation, followed UNOSOM. Its mandate, un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter, was to use force to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations.7 5 Upon restoration of
peace (albeit of a precarious nature) in southern and central Somalia, a
second peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II, took over operational re-
sponsibility for the area. This operation is sometimes described as a
peacekeeping force, and yet was "deployed without the consent of the
parties, [and had] the right to use all necessary measures to carry out
its mandate - including the right to the use of force." 76 Such use of
force was authorized because UNITAF's task of establishing a secure
environment in all of Somalia was "far from complete" when UNOSOM
72. Goulding, supra note 38. Marrack Goulding is the Under-Secretary-General for
Political Affairs of the United Nations.
73. Indeed, Goulding merely divides the new uses of force into two categories: force
authorized to protect civilians; and force authorized to protect humanitarian activities.
See id.
74. Fink, supra note 8, at 31.
75. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
76. Serge Lalande, Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping, in NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 69, 77 (Daniel Warner ed., 1995).
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II took over.77 In this respect, UNOSOM II must be regarded as an en-
forcement measure, albeit under the control and command of the
United Nations. While, for this reason, UNOSOM II does not truly fit
within the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning the operation be-
cause it forged a path for the use of force to deliver humanitarian assis-
tance. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to "take appropriate action,
including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a se-
cure environment for humanitarian assistance."78 Although UNOSOM
II had many other purposes and duties, 79 this was the driving force be-
hind the operation.
This theme has been picked up in subsequent peacekeeping opera-
tions. The role of UNPROFOR in delivering humanitarian relief was
confirmed in numerous Security Council resolutions. 80 Although the
use of force was not explicitly authorized for this purpose in these
resolutions, it is interesting to note that the Secretary-General was of
the opinion that force could be used. In September 1992 the Secretary-
General stated that, in the context of ensuring the delivery of humani-
tarian aid and protecting humanitarian convoys, "self-defence is
deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by force
to prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate." 81
Clearly the Secretary-General was of the opinion that self-defense could
include situations involving the protection of third parties. The fact,
however, that the operation was later explicitly authorized to use force
to secure their freedom of movement in resolution 871 (primarily to en-
77. UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 71, at 42.
78. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 75. See also S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 3188th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993) (establishing UNOSOM II); BLUE HELMETS I, supra note 6, at
722.
79. These duties included, through disarmament and reconciliation, the restoration of
peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included monitoring the cessa-
tion of hostilities, preventing resumption of violence, seizing unauthorized small arms,
maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of
humanitarian assistance, continuing mine clearing and assisting in repatriation of refu-
gees in Somalia. See S.C. Res. 814, supra note 78; Further Report of the Secretary-General
Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1993), U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., Addendum 1, U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add. 1 (1993); Further Report of the Secretary-
General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1993), U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., Addendum 2, U.N. Doc. S/25354/Add.2 (1993) (proposing that the
mandate of UNOSOM II cover the whole country and include enforcement powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter).
80. See S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/776
(1992); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/770 (1992);
S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/764 (1992); S.C. Res.
761, U.N. SCOR, 3087 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992); S.C. Res. 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3066th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/749 (1992); S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
81. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess. 1 9, U.N. Doc. S/24540 (1992).
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sure delivery of humanitarian assistance) seems to indicate that the Se-
curity Council did not regard UNPROFOR as being able to use such ex-
tensive force without explicit authorization. 82 This interpretation is
supported by a later resolution which similarly explicitly authorized the
use of force in self-defense in the safe areas, in the event of any obstruc-
tion in or around the areas which interfered with the freedom of move-
ment of protected humanitarian convoys.8 3
UNCRO's mandate also included "facilitating the delivery of inter-
national humanitarian assistance" and other humanitarian tasks.8 4 Al-
though the use of force was not explicitly authorized in Resolution 981,
the resolution under which UNCRO was established, the operation's
mandate included "facilitating the implementation of all relevant Secu-
rity Council resolutions."8 5 In the Report of the Secretary-General Sub-
mitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 981
(1995) the Secretary-General stated clearly that the resolutions referred
to in resolution 981 included "those relevant to the functioning of
UNCRO (freedom of movement, security, self-defense, including close
air support)."8 6 This implies that force could be used in 'self-defense'
where it was necessary to ensure freedom of movement and the delivery
of humanitarian aid. As part of the implementation of UNCRO's man-
date was to protect and escort humanitarian convoys,8 7 and given that
the use of force in self-defense to ensure freedom of movement had pre-
viously been explicitly authorized, it is plausible to argue that force
could be used in self-defense to protect humanitarian convoys and en-
sure assistance was delivered. 88
In Rwanda, the Security Council "recognized" that the United Na-
tions Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) might need to take action in self-
defense "against persons or groups who threaten[ed] . . . the means of
delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief."8 9 Interestingly, there
was no explicit authorization to use force in this regard and no refer-
ence made to Chapter VII. This implies that, in this instance, the Secu-
rity Council did not believe it was necessary to explicitly authorize such
82. See discussion below on the use of force to secure freedom of movement of UN
personnel.
83. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9. See discussion below on the use of force to secure
freedom of movement of UN personnel.
84. S.C. Res. 981, supra note 66 3(c), (e). United Nations Confidence Restoration
Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) was one of the three peacekeeping operations which re-
placed UNPROFOR.
85. Id. 3(c).
86. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security
Council Resolution 981 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess. 1 18, U.N. Doc. S/1995/320 (1995).
87. Id. I 24(c).
88. S.C. Res. 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/871 (1993).
89. See S.C. Res. 925, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3388th mtg. 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/925
(1994); S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918
(1994).
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a use of force. This interpretation is supported by the Report of the Sec-
retary-General on the Situation in Rwanda. In this report it was made
clear that UNAMIR was expected to provide security assistance to hu-
manitarian organizations in their programs for distribution of relief
supplies. 90 Although the rules of engagement were not to envisage en-
forcement action, it was acknowledged that UNAMIR might have to
take action in self-defense against persons who threatened the means of
delivery and the distribution of humanitarian relief.91 As before, no ex-
plicit mention is made of the use of force in this report, however, be-
cause 'rules of engagement,' by definition, cover the use force it is clear
that forceful measures were contemplated. Furthermore, the Secretary-
General was of the opinion that for UNAMIR to successfully execute its
mandate it had to be "composed of a credible, well-armed and highly
mobile force" indicating that the operation had to be suitably armed for
such a role.92
B. Force Authorized to Secure the Freedom of Movement of UN
Personnel: UNPROFOR, UNCRO & UNTAES
Freedom of movement is deemed to be essential to the functioning
of all peacekeeping operations and is generally provided for in the
Status of Forces Agreements establishing an operation. 93 The right to
use force in self-defense to defend one's freedom of movement has ex-
isted since ONUC. Bowett has stated that:
In simple terms, it may be said that ONUC was entitled to assert
its freedom of movement and to resort to self-defence against any
action constituting a denial of freedom of movement: this would not
have meant abandoning the principle, then operative, that ONUC
could not take the initiative in military action. 94
Schachter has likewise recognized that a "significant extension of
self-defense resulted from granting the ONUC freedom of movement
throughout the country."95  UNPROFOR, however, was the first
peacekeeping operation to be explicitly authorized to use force in self-
defense to ensure freedom of movement and some commentators regard
this authorization as significantly expanding the concept. 96
90. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 12, U.N. Doc. S/1994/565 (1994).
91. Id. 1 15.
92. Id. 1 16 (emphasis added).
93. Bowett states that "the right to freedom of movement should be acknowledged by
the host State as early as possible [and] recognized in the basic agreement, but the details
of the right should be worked out in the SOFA." See BOWETT, supra note 4, at 434.
94. Id. at 204.
95. Schachter, supra note 5, at 85.
96. Certainly Fink is of the view that "the peacekeeper's mandate to use force for self-
defense in Bosnia is greatly expanded by their authority to secure 'free movement,'
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What distinguishes the use of force to secure freedom of movement
in recent operations from past operations is that recently it has been
closely linked to the delivery of humanitarian aid. Not surprisingly
then, there is a fair degree of overlap between the force authorized to
secure free movement and that authorized to ensure delivery of aid.
The main difference between the two is that force here is being used to
secure the freedom of movement of UN personnel, as opposed to hu-
manitarian convoys. For example, in order to carry out their humani-
tarian objectives, UNPROFOR was authorized under Chapter VII of the
Charter, "in carrying out its mandate in the Republic of Croatia, acting
in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use force,
to ensure its security and freedom of movement."97 This new resolution
was passed primarily to enable the operation to ensure that humani-
tarian assistance was provided in compliance with earlier Security
Council resolutions. 98 Arguably, this explicit authorization indicates
that the Security Council was in some way expanding the operation's
original self-defense mandate. 99 The Security Council's determination
to ensure the freedom of movement of UN personnel was reaffirmed in
many subsequent Security Council resolutions. 100
The trend allowing peacekeepers to use more forceful measures to
secure their freedom of movement in order to deliver humanitarian aid,
was implicitly followed in two subsequent former-Yugoslavia opera-
tions. In Security Council Resolution 981, in which UNCRO was estab-
lished,101 the Security Council reaffirmed its "determination to ensure
the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of United Na-
tions [pleace-keeping operations in the territory of the former Yugosla-
via."102 The peacekeeping operation was established under Chapter VII
thereby facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid." See Fink, supra note 8, at 37.
97. S.C. Res. 871, supra note 88 9 (emphasis added). Fink likens the mandate of the
peacekeepers in Bosnia to that of the ONUC peacekeepers in the Congo. Fink, supra note
8, at 31.
98. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9.
99. The language of this authorization followed that used in the earlier Security
Council Resolution 836, which had authorized peacekeepers to use force in self-defense to
ensure their freedom of movement within certain 'safe areas.' See discussion below con-
cerning the authorized use of force to protect 'safe areas' and 'protected sites and popula-
tions.'
100. See generally S.C. Res. 1026, U.N. SCOR, 3601st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1026
(1995); S.C. Res. 998, U.N. SCOR, 3543d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/998 (1995); S.C. Res. 987,
U.N. SCOR, 3521st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/987 (1995); S.C. Res. 982, U.N. SCOR, 3512th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/982 (1995); S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 3434th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/947 (1994); S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/941 (1994);
S.C. Res. 914, U.N. SCOR, 3369th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/914 (1994).
101. United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia.
102. S.C. Res. 981, supra note 66. This determination was reaffirmed in Security
Council Resolutions 990, 994, 1009, and 1025. See S.C. Res. 1025, U.N. SCOR, 3600th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1025 (1995); S.C. Res. 1009, U.N. SCOR, 3563d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1009 (1995); S.C. Res. 994, U.N. SCOR, 3537th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/994 (1995);
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of the Charter. As stated above, in the Secretary's report on the opera-
tion he made it clear that the previous resolutions relevant to the func-
tioning of UNCRO applied to the operation. This included resolutions
relating to freedom of movement and self-defense. 103 As UNPROFOR
had previously been authorized to use force in self-defense to secure
freedom of movement in Croatia, there seems to be no reason why
UNCRO would not also be covered by this authorization.
The operation that took over from UNCRO, UNTAES, was estab-
lished under Security Council Resolution 1037.104 In this resolution the
Security Council again stated that it was "determined to ensure the se-
curity and freedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations
peace-keeping operation in the Republic of Croatia." 10 5  As with
UNCRO, the peacekeeping operation was established under Chapter
VII of the Charter. Although the use of force is not explicitly authorized
in this operation it was made clear by the Secretary-General in his Re-
port Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025 (1995), that the op-
eration implemented should be able to use force, at least in self-defense.
He stated, in advising the UN on the type of force to be implemented,
that:
The force deployed must... have a mandate under Chapter VII of
the Charter, must have the capacity to take the necessary action to
maintain peace and security, must be sufficiently credible to deter
attack from any side and must be capable of defending itself. Any-
thing less than a well-armed division-sized force would only risk re-
peating the failures of the recent past.106
It is not clear what the scope of this use of force is and whether or
to what extent it included the use of force to ensure freedom of move-
ment. The absence of an explicit authorization allowing force to be used
in this manner indicates, however, that unlike the UNPROFOR and
UNCRO operations, the scope of the right to self-defense with regards
to UNCRO should be interpreted more narrowly. There does not ap-
pear to be any reason, however, why force could not be used to secure
movement required to carry out its mandated tasks, such as facilitating
the return of refugees. 107
S.C. Res. 990, U.N. SCOR, 3527th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES990 (1995).
103. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security
Council Resolution 981 (1995), supra note 86 118.
104. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium.
105. S.C. Res. 1037, supra note 66.
106. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1025,
U.N. SCOR 1 22, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1028 (1995).
107. S.C. Res. 1037, supra note 661 1 1(d).
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C. Force Authorized to Protect 'Safe Areas' & 'Protected Sites &
Populations:' UNPROFOR & UNAMIR
In 1993, the critical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina led the
Security Council to adopt two resolutions under Chapter VII creating
six 'safe areas' primarily aimed at protecting the civilian populations in
those areas. Under Security Council Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, the
Security Council decided to ensure full respect for these areas. 0 8 For
this purpose the Council extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to en-
able it to deter attacks made against the areas. It further authorized
UNPROFOR:
[A]cting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including
the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas, in
reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties
or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate ob-
struction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys. 109
The Security Council also authorized Member States, acting na-
tionally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take
through the use of air power in and around the safe areas and in close
coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all neces-
sary measures to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its man-
date. l0 Subsequently NATO enforced the use of air power authorized
by the Security Council for "close air support" to protect UNPROFOR
personnel and for "air strikes" to enforce respect for the safe areas.
However, it is clear that UNPROFOR, in its own right as a peacekeep-
ing operation, was authorized to use force in self-defense.
A parallel can be drawn in Rwanda where 'protected sites' were to
be established, patrolled and monitored by UNAMIR. In Resolution
918, the Security Council recognized that "UNAMIR may be required to
take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten pro-
tected sites and populations.""' Interestingly, as described above, no
reference is made to Chapter VII or the use of force in this context. It is
possible to argue that the "action" described does not include the use of
force, however, this seems unlikely. More likely is that the Security
Council did not believe it was required to explicitly authorize such a use
of force. As discussed above, support for this interpretation can be
108. Established under Security Council Resolutionw 819 and 824. See S.C. Res. 824,
U.N. SCOR, 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993); S.C. Res. 819, U.N.SCOR, 3199th
mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/ 819 (1993).
109. S.C. Res. 836, supra note 66 1 9 (emphasis added).
110. Id. 1 10.
111. See S.C. Res. 918, supra note 66 j 4; S.C. Res. 925, supra note 89 5 (emphasis
added).
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found in the Secretary-General's report on Rwanda. 112 He stated that
the rules of engagement would not cover enforcement measures, but ac-
knowledged that UNAMIR might have to take action in self-defense to
protect sites and populations. 1 3 There is no reason why the use of force
would not be included in this "action."
Later, in a letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council, in which he reports on the breakdown
of the peace process in Rwanda," 4 the Secretary-General recommends
that a French-commanded multinational operation take place in
Rwanda under Chapter VII of the Charter. Interestingly, in this letter
he states that:
[I]t would be necessary for it to request the Governments concerned
to commit themselves to maintain their troops in Rwanda until
UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength to take over from
the multinational force and the latter has created conditions in
which a peace-keeping force operating under Chapter VI of the Char-
ter would have the capacity to carry out its mandate. 1 5
This indicates clearly that the Secretary-General did not regard
any use of force in self-defense by UNAMIR as requiring authorization
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In fact he seems to regard
UNAMIR as an operation falling squarely within Chapter VI of the
Charter.
D. Conclusion
As discussed above, there is clear evidence that 'self-defense' has
been, or is in the process of being, expanded to include the defense of
third parties: namely, civilian populations and humanitarian convoys.
Force has also been authorized to ensure the freedom of movement of
UN personnel. Although on its face this does not appear to be an ex-
pansion of the concept of self-defense, the purpose for which such force
is authorized in fact brings this use of force within the rubric of pro-
tecting humanitarian activities, and thus indirectly third parties. This
expanded use of force can be traced from the explicit authorizations for
the use of force in self-defense in UNPROFOR, to the implicit acknowl-
edgment that such force may be used in self-defense in UNAMIR. It is
not clear, with regards to future operations, what kind of authorization
or acknowledgement would be required (if any) to enable an operation
to legitimately use force in this manner.
112. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, supra note 90.
113. Id. 1 15.
114. Letter Dated 19 June From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1994/728 (1994).
115. Id. 1 12 (emphasis added).
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It is true that the uses of force outlined above can all be described
as being in 'defense of a mandate'. The use of force to secure freedom of
movement was to enable humanitarian aid to be delivered, 1" 6 the use of
force to protect safe areas was to enable the civilian population to be
protected, 117 and the use of force to protect humanitarian convoys ful-
filled, in an even more direct way, the mandate to provide humanitar-
ian relief.118 Indeed, it is not clear why the Security Council regarded it
as necessary to explicitly authorize the use of such force in 'self-defense'
in the first place, given that such force would have presumably could
have come within the already established inherent right to 'defend one's
mandate.' Whether the Security Council did so because it felt legally
bound to, or whether it did so merely because it wanted to make it une-
quivocally clear that peacekeeping operations could use such force, is
not evident. France, for example, was of the opinion that bringing the
UNPROFOR operation under Chapter VII, was in itself enough to
strengthen the peacekeeping's operation traditional right to self-
defense, without the need for explicit authorization.119
Ultimately it is not clear on what basis force can and cannot be
used by peacekeeping operations. Nor is it clear how far the concept of
self-defense can be pushed. At the moment it is apparently limitless,
able to encompass even the defense of others so long as a legitimate
mandate is being pursued. This, in effect, means that the use of force is
dependent on an operation's mandate, not on any clear and fixed rules
as to how force may and may not be used. The confusion and vagueness
that results from this approach must prevail in all operations where
clear authorization for the use of force is not set. The main problem
with this is that too much is left to chance. Troops are left to apply
force haphazardly, with authority to use that force being drawn, not
from a mandate, or any concept of an inherent right to defend third par-
ties, but through guesswork and reading between the lines. This is not
a desirable state of affairs: it leads to misunderstandings and possible
recriminations. Furthermore, while such use of force may come within
the concept of 'defending one's mandate,' that is not to say that it
should. There are many implications to allowing a peacekeeping opera-
tion to use more forceful measures in carrying out its mandate. Some of
these are discussed below.
116. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for example.
117. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda for example.
118. In Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Rwanda for example.
119. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy
Fourth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 3174th mtg., at 13-15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3174 (1993) (remarks
of Ambassador Merim6e of France).
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V. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPANDED USE OF FORCE BY
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS?
Creating this kind of grey area between peace-keeping and peace en-
forcement can give rise to considerable dangers. In political, legal
and military terms, and in terms of the survival of one's own troops,
there is all the difference in the world between being deployed with
the consent and cooperation of the parties to help them carry out an
agreement they have reached and, on the other hand, being de-
ployed without their consent and with powers to use force to compel
them to accept the decisions of the Security Council.120
As the above passage indicates, there are many implications in-
volved in having a peacekeeping operation that can exercise a more ex-
tensive amount of force than was traditionally the case. The problems
that arise have two root causes. First, the use of force is unpredictable
because there is no understanding regarding the basis on which force is
used by peacekeeping operations or how force can and cannot be used.
Secondly, the use of force undermines the fundamental principles of
peacekeeping and confuses the concepts of peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. As Fink has stated, the "blurring of peacekeeping 'guiding
principles' and peace-enforcement standards for use of force... jeop-
ardizes the safety of the peacekeepers and hampers the effectiveness of
their mission."12 1 Thus there are two issues that need to be dealt with
by the international community. First, when and how force is used by
peacekeeping operations needs to be clarified. It appears that the
United Nations has recognized this need and is currently undertaking
the complex project of revising guidelines for rules of engagement for
future peacekeeping operations. This is being done in light of the fact
that the use of force in peacekeeping operations and 'Chapter VII opera-
tions' is no longer distinct and separate. However, these guidelines are
unlikely to be completed for quite some time.122
Secondly, the international community needs to determine whether
it is in fact desirable to 'blur' the notions of peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. Certainly once a peacekeeping operation uses force be-
yond that required for self-defense, the line between defensive and of-
fensive force becomes harder to distinguish. Indeed, if a peacekeeping
operation has a broad mandate, it is possible to argue that any force
used is exercised in defense of the operation's purpose. Yet it is not
hard to see how far removed this is from acting in strict self-defense.
120. Goulding, supra note 6, at 461.
121. Fink, supra note 8, at 31.
122. I have been given this information by a senior legal officer in the Office of the Le-
gal Counsel, United Nations Secretariat, New York. I was also told that the current
model rules of engagement, the mission specific rules of engagement and the revised rules
of engagement are confidential.
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For example, it is possible to argue that UNOSOM II was a peacekeep-
ing operation acting in defense of its widely drawn mandate, rather
than an 'enforcement measure.' Clearly, almost any forceful action
taken by a UN operation can be described as a 'peacekeeping operation
defending its mandate' if the mandate is wide enough. The danger with
this approach is that "once you allow a peacekeeping force to use force
in defence of its purposes instead of simply in defence of its personnel,
the action becomes an enforcement action."123 This is even truer if force
is used in defense of third parties. Because peacekeeping operations
and enforcement actions are so different, the legal significance of
merging the two operations should not be underestimated. 124 Some of
the problems and implications that have emerged due to the unpredict-
ability and confusion regarding the use of force by peacekeepers are dis-
cussed below.
A. Legal Implications
The most fundamental problem with authorizing peacekeepers to
use force is that the use of force is not compatible with consent and im-
partiality. This problem has legal and practical implications. If force is
authorized in order to allow peacekeepers to implement part of their
mandate, ultimately it tends to jeopardize other parts of the mandate,
which rely upon the consent and cooperation of the parties. Although
technically such force would only be used to support a peacekeeping
mandate under threat, the practical reality is that the use of such force
could not be carried out without endangering the peacekeeping opera-
tion as a whole. As the Secretary-General put it in his supplement to
the Agenda for Peace: "To blur the distinction between the two
[peacekeeping operations and enforcement measures] can undermine
the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its person-
nel."125 Ironically, therefore, a mandate designed to protect such per-
sonnel under the banner of "self-defense" may ultimately do more harm
than good.
Aside from the legal difficulty of distinguishing between
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, there are other legal
issues which arise in this context. One such issue derives from the need
to have a clear legal understanding as to the nature of peacekeeping.
Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General,
Office of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, has explained,
123. McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 87.
124. Some of the practical implications of merging the two operations are outlined be-
low.
125. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on
the Occassion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR 1 35, U.N.
Doc. A150/60 - S/1995/1 (1995).
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Insistence on clarifying the nature of meaning of peacekeeping is
not merely a lawyer's obsession with clarity and legal definition; it
is necessary because the legal character and nature of the operation
has a direct bearing on the legal issues which arise and their reso-
lution.1 26
As emphasized in the introduction to this paper, lack of clarity in
an operation's mandate will give rise to legal difficulties when drafting
peacekeeping agreements between the parties (such as SOFAs) and
giving advice on the interpretation and implementation of such agree-
ments. More specifically, with regards to the use of force, if it is not
clear what authority there is for the use of force, difficult questions
arise about what the acceptable levels and uses of force are. As stated
above, it is the rules of engagement that govern the use of force in the
field.1 27 If the mandate of the Security Council is not clear, then the
rules of engagement cannot accurately reflect the degree of force that
has been authorized by the Council. The importance of specifying the
authority for the use of force in order that it can be articulated in the
rules of engagement is crucial to establishing an operation with a clear,
purposeful, and attainable mandate. 128
Other more probing issues arise in this context: for example,. can
the peacekeepers use force in "anticipatory" self-defense when the use of
force against them while carrying out their mandate is foreseeable? Do
the customary requirements of necessity and proportionality apply to
an expanded form of self-defense in the context of peacekeeping? 129
These questions should not be left unresolved only to be 'answered' by
chance through future uses of force in the field. As sound reasons are
needed to explain and justify why force may be used in one situation
and not in another it is preferable to clarify the instances in which force
can be used before, rather than after, the event. Furthermore, it is bet-
ter to use legal reasoning to justify the use of force, rather than ap-
pealing to ad hoc and random arguments in any given situation. Such
legal reasoning is more likely to enable a consensus among Member
States to develop with regards to the use of force. As the future credi-
bility of the United Nations depends on successful peacekeeping opera-
tions the utmost attention must be given to these legal issues, and the
sooner the better.
126. Ralph Zacklin, Managing Peacekeeping from a Legal Perspective, in NEW
DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 159, 159 (Daniel Warner, ed. 1995).
127. McCOUBREY & WHITE, supra note 21, at 146-47.
128. Fink, supra note 8, at 46.
129. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1635-38 (1984).
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B. Political and Military Implications
While expanding the concept of self-defense to include a more of-
fensive use of force may be legitimate and cannot be regarded as illegal
or intrinsically 'bad,' such an expansion may lead to great political and
military difficulties when conducting operations. This is particularly so
if the differences between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement become
blurred. Some of these problems are outlined below. 130
It may be harder to get a host State or States to consent to a
peacekeeping operation if the "operation is perceived as liable to be
transformed into a peace-enforcement operation against one party
which initially accepted the deployment."131 Thus, peacekeeping may,
as a result, become an increasingly ineffective and useless tool of the
UN, with peace-enforcement left as the primary measure of resolving
conflict in the world. If this were to happen the UN would arguably
find itself less able to resolve disputes via conciliatory means.
It may be harder to get States to contribute troops to peacekeeping
operations if they may be involved in the use of coercive force. This
may be due to constitutional reasons. For example, neutral countries or
countries with constitutional limitations on getting involved in foreign
military involvement, may find it difficult to reconcile involvement in
such a force with their constitutional values or limitations.132 Alterna-
tively States may be reluctant to contribute troops for political reasons.
Clearly, there is a huge political difference between becoming involved
in a peacekeeping operation with the consent of a host State and work-
ing with the cooperation of the parties as opposed to taking sides in a
conflict and imposing Security Council resolutions by the use of force.
States will have to pay much greater regard to their domestic and for-
eign policies before deciding to become involved in operations that may
entail forceful measures. This is primarily because a State could only
justify risking the lives of its military personnel if it had a significant
national interest in the conflict.
It follows then, that in an enforcement operation States with a
vested interest in the matter are more likely to get involved than neu-
tral States. Thus, not only are peacekeeping operations that use force
less likely to retain the consent and impartiality of the parties (princi-
ples they traditionally espoused), but they may no longer attract the
neutral States that they want and need for an operation to be viewed as
130. See also Lalande, supra note 76; Connie Peck, Summary of Colloquium on New
Dimensions of Peacekeeping, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACEKEEPING 181 (Daniel Warner
ed., 1995).
131. Lalande, supra note 76, at 78.
132. Neutral countries include Austria, Switzerland, Finland or Sweden. Countries
with constitutional limitations on foreign military involvement include Japan and Ger-
many.
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impartial by the host State. The national make-up of operations may
inadvertently aggravate the conflict, where for example it is a dispute
based on ethnic or religious grounds.
In military terms there is a vast difference between a peacekeeping
operation and peace-enforcement measures. This is particularly true of
the military conduct and command structure of the operation and how
it is equipped. For example, the way in which force can be used and the
rules of engagement vary greatly according to the type of operation that
is undertaken. Furthermore, a peacekeeping operation may be author-
ized to use force but, in reality, not be equipped to do so. Thus if it does
try to use force it may leave itself exposed to more forceful attacks to
which it cannot reply. Leaving the use of force to Member States who
can 'support' the peacekeeping operation using 'all necessary measures'
is unlikely to resolve the problem. Peacekeepers are still more likely
bear the brunt of any forceful retaliation. 133
The relations between all the parties in peacekeeping operations,
as opposed to the relations in an enforcement operation, are different.
In a peacekeeping operation everyone works together in a conciliatory
atmosphere of cooperation. In peace-enforcement all parties are adver-
saries and the mission is in a position of authority. It is not realistic to
expect that a peacekeeping operation based on consent and impartiality
would be able to retain those qualities if force was used against parties
in a conflict. The very basis upon which peacekeeping is founded is un-
dermined by allowing an expansive use of force to take place.
On a more theoretical level, conflicting concepts of peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement may "lead to confusion, uncertainty and ambi-
guity in the minds of policy makers currently designing the shape of
their countries' involvement in future peacekeeping operations."13 For
example, policies may be designed which limit a country's involvement
in future peacekeeping operations because of concern about what kind
of operations are being instigated by the UN. A good example of this is
in the U.S. where, in response to the events in Somalia, President
Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive which severely limited
the future role of U.S. troops in peacekeeping operations. 135
A more ethereal effect of the lack of a clear-cut distinction between
a peacekeeping operation and peace-enforcement is that it makes it ex-
133. Goulding, supra note 38, at 10.
134. Lalande, supra note 76, at 80.
135. See Statement by the Press Secretary on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 998 (May 5, 1994). The United States will now only par-
ticipate where there have been grave threats to international peace and security, major
disasters which require relief, or gross violations of human rights. U.S. troops would
most likely be under U.S. command. See Fink, supra note 8, at 46; Steven J. Lepper, The
Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's
Analysis, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 359, 366 (1996).
VOL. 27:2
BEYOND SELF DEFENSE
tremely difficult for the press and the general public at large, to com-
prehend the role, nature and purposes of future UN peacekeeping op-
erations. The importance of this problem should not be underesti-
mated. Public opinion, which is sharply influenced by the press, may be
decisive in determining whether action is taken in a humanitarian cri-
sis and in determining whether a State gets involved or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
The erosion of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping occurs
when force is authorized to such a degree that it can be used to protect
third parties and carry out any part of a broad mandate. Such use of
force threatens the basis of successful peacekeeping and does not neces-
sarily lead to better results. While the concept of self-defense has been
deemed to include 'defense of one's mandate', the continued expansion
of this concept, in order to give peace-keepers even greater enforcement
powers, is not a good idea for the legal, political and military reasons
described above. It is time for the United Nations to accept that it must
"either maintain a neutral role with consent of parties to the conflict in
future peacekeeping operations, or be prepared to encounter increasing
threats to the safety of its peacekeepers and be ready to exercise a level
of force beyond the traditional legal meaning of self-defense." 136 In
other words, it must choose between peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement as its two major methods of conflict resolution.
However, if recent uses of force (as discussed in this paper) are to
be regarded as a legitimate expansion of the concept of self-defense, it is
essential that the legal basis for such force and the extent to which it
can be used, be definitively clarified. It is in the interest of everyone,
the UN, the host and contributing States, the troops who risk their
lives, and the public at large, that the extent to which peacekeeping
troops may become involved in a conflict is made clear. It is only with
this kind of clarification that an extensive use of force by a peacekeep-
ing body will remain, in any sense, palatable with the goals and pur-
poses of peacekeeping. The fundamental principles of peacekeeping
were developed and based on sound legal and practical reasoning. They
should not be done away with without serious reflection about what the
possible consequences might be.
136. Fink, supra note 8, at 45.
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